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Executive summary 
This study addresses establishment mode decisions by emerging-market multinational 
enterprises entering other emerging economies. More precisely, we examine the influence of 
prior host country experience and home government official visits on the choice between the 
acquisition of a local company and the creation of a new subsidiary from scratch. By 
analyzing 315 investments carried out by Chinese firms in Latin America, we obtain that they 
are more likely to enter through an acquisition when they have established prior subsidiaries 
in the host country. Moreover, recent Chinese government official visits contribute to mitigate 
the difficulties of an acquisition for those companies with less local experience.  




Establishment mode choice is a key decision for multinational enterprises (MNEs) when 
entering a foreign country. It refers to the choice between an acquisition, namely, the takeover 
of an already existing company in the host country, and a greenfield subsidiary, i.e., the 
creation of a new subsidiary from scratch. This decision has important implications for both 
the foreign firm and the host country. As for the foreign firm, the acquisition of a local 
company may provide useful resources that facilitate the entry in an unknown environment. 
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Despite of this, uncertainty may hinder the identification and assessment of potential local 
targets and generate additional difficulties when integrating the acquired unit. Regarding the 
host country, an acquisition may raise legitimacy concerns, since it represents the transfer of 
existing facilities to the new acquirer, thus generating less job creation opportunities than a 
greenfield subsidiary. Moreover, the negative reaction to a foreign acquisition may be 
reinforced if the local target belongs to an industry considered strategic by the host 
government. 
Prior research has identified a number of firm-, industry-, and country-specific factors 
as determinants of establishment mode choice abroad (Slangen & Hennart, 2007). However, 
as highlighted by some recent literature reviews, there are still significant research gaps 
(Dikova & Brouthers, 2016; Klier et al., 2017). First, most past studies mainly focused on 
direct relationships, not addressing the potential effects of interactions between determinants, 
in particular, the role played by contextual factors as moderators of the influence of firm-
specific resources. Second, in spite of the growing relevance of emerging-market MNEs, 
empirical studies analyzing their establishment mode choice are still scant. Third, we know 
far less about this choice when emerging-market MNEs enter other emerging economies.  
Outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) flows from an emerging economy to other 
emerging economies represent a peculiar context that may challenge the conventional wisdom 
(Wright et al., 2005). The competitive disadvantage of operating in an underdeveloped 
institutional environment at home may turn into a competitive advantage when emerging-
market MNEs do business in a host country with similar weak institutional conditions 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). In addition, past research suggests that home government 
support for going global also matters, allowing emerging-market MNEs to offset their 
latecomer disadvantages (Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010). This may become a key factor for those 
emerging-market MNEs with low host market-specific experience. Support policies from the 
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home government may provide them with useful resources to take more risks when choosing 
the establishment mode. Hence, analyzing this decision in the context of emerging economies 
as home and host countries deserves research attention, since it may allow obtaining new 
insights on the applicability of extant theoretical underpinnings for explaining the less 
conventional behavior of emerging-market MNEs (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012). 
Among emerging-market MNEs, those from China stand out, as their international 
activity has grown exponentially in the last decade. OFDI flows by Chinese companies have 
multiplied by six between 2007 and 2017, to the point that China is already the third largest 
investor in the world, only surpassed by the United States and Japan (UNCTAD, 2018). 
Emerging markets are increasingly attracting Chinese investments, with Latin American 
countries becoming key targets. Latin America is already the second main destination of 
China’s OFDI, only behind Asia (NBS, 2018). The Chinese government is playing a 
significant role in boosting political and economic ties with Latin America, by signing 
investment and trade agreements (Fornes & Butt-Philip, 2011). Moreover, by reinforcing 
bilateral diplomatic relationships with Latin American countries, including official visits, the 
Chinese government facilitates the access of Chinese MNEs to local natural resources, also 
reducing potential conflicts with host governments in a region where political risk is higher 
for MNEs from other home countries (Shapiro, Vecino, & Li, 2018). 
Therefore, the aim of our study is to deepen our knowledge of how Chinese MNEs 
make decisions on establishment mode in other emerging economies such as those of Latin 
America. More precisely, drawing on information economics and institutional theory, we seek 
to answer the following questions. First, does prior host country experience lead Chinese 
MNEs to prefer the acquisition of a local firm rather than a greenfield investment? Second, 
can Chinese government official visits to the focal host country mitigate the lack of firm’s 
prior experience on that local environment?  
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We offer a number of contributions to the literature on emerging-market MNEs and 
establishment mode decisions. First, we contribute to information economics and institutional 
theory by addressing how good bilateral diplomatic activities may be an institutional tool that 
allows alleviating information asymmetries and enhancing local legitimacy in the host 
environment. By doing so, we contribute to the current epistemological debate on the validity 
of traditional theoretical frameworks in the case of emerging-market MNEs. Second, we 
provide new empirical evidence to establishment mode decisions by emerging-market MNEs 
when they enter other emerging economies, a research topic that has received scant attention 
so far. Third, we offer insights on how diplomacy may help foreign firms lacking local 
knowledge to establish through acquisitions.  
In the remainder of this article, we first provide the theoretical background for 
developing hypotheses on the relationship between host country-specific experience and 
establishment mode choice, as well as the moderating influence of official government visits. 
In the subsequent section, we explain the methodology of our empirical analysis. After 
presenting the results, we conclude with a discussion and a suggestion for potential future 
research on this topic. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Extant literature emphasizes that firm-specific characteristics may affect OFDI decisions, in 
particular, those related to establishment mode choice (Nagano, 2013). One of these 
characteristics is firm’s previous experience with the host country (Drogendijk & Slangen, 
2006). Foreign firms may obtain knowledge about the host country through experiential 
learning (Pedersen & Shaver, 2011). Learning to operate effectively in the host market is 
largely a by-product of doing business there and it is irreplaceable by knowledge accumulated 
in other countries (Larimo, 2003; Liu et al., 2016). Firms that are familiar with a foreign 
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market have a better understanding of the peculiarities of the local context and they may have 
developed routines to deal with the challenges of operating in that market (Padmanabhan & 
Cho, 1999; Slangen & Hennart, 2008). This type of location-bound learning helps firms to 
reduce liabilities of foreignness and to develop knowledge on the institutional aspects of 
operating an entry mode in a specific destination (Schwens et al., 2018). As a result, prior 
literature posits that experience-based resources have an impact on establishment mode choice 
in foreign markets (Klier et al., 2017).  
Information economics provides a theoretical explanation for this relationship. 
Information economics analyzes how information affects economic decisions by focusing on 
the existence of information asymmetries between the parties involved in a transaction, i.e. 
when one party has more or better information than the other (Akerlof, 1970; Stigler, 1961). 
These information asymmetries are usually present in cross-border acquisitions, since they 
have two inherent problems, namely, the inspection and the interaction problems (Ravenscraft 
& Scherer, 1987). Inspection problems derive from the fact that the seller has typically better 
information than the buyer so the latter have more difficulties to evaluate the target firm ex-
ante. Interaction problems refer to the ex-post integration of the acquired firm into the 
acquirer’s corporation. Acquisitions are more difficult to manage than greenfield subsidiaries, 
especially because both the acquiring and the acquired companies have their own corporate 
cultures and post-integration obstacles may arise (Hennart & Park, 1993). 
Information asymmetries are likely to be more important for those firms with low 
host-country specific experience, since they will be less familiar with existing local firms and 
they will face more difficulties to evaluate and integrate target firms, thus preferring to 
establish a subsidiary from scratch (Mudambi & Mudambi, 2002; Slangen & Hennart, 2007). 
Conversely, firms with prior experience in the host country will have a better understanding 
of how local firms operate and are organized and they will know more about local culture and 
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communication style (Slangen & Hennart, 2008). Hence, host country experience is a kind of 
valuable knowledge that allows foreign firms to identify and evaluate local firms that are 
potential acquisition targets and to negotiate better with local managers in order to reduce 
acquisition premiums, helping them to solve the above-mentioned ex-ante inspection 
problems (Dikova, Sahib, & van Witteloostuijn, 2010; Larimo, 2003). Moreover, local 
experience allows the firm to learn the peculiarities of local culture, which can reduce 
implementation obstacles and facilitate knowledge transfer to the acquired unit, overcoming 
ex-post interaction problems (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998). Therefore, host country-specific 
experience is a valuable resource that firms are more likely to exploit through acquisitions 
(Klier et al., 2017). 
In addition, local experience may also contribute to the legitimacy of the foreign firm 
in the host country, namely, the degree to which it is perceived as acceptable by stakeholders, 
including the host government (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). As the firm accumulates host 
country experience, it will be better known among host government branches, even it might 
have established ties with them (Slangen, 2013). By becoming embedded in these local 
networks, the status of the foreign firm may change from that of an ‘outsider’ to more of an 
‘insider’ (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2011). As a consequence, the local environment becomes 
more accustomed to the presence of that firm and tends to perceive it as more legitimate 
(Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). These legitimacy issues lead us to consider also insights from 
the institutional theory. 
Institutional theory deals with the political, social and economic systems that surround 
firms and shape their behavior (North, 1990). It is one of the most usual theoretical 
underpinnings used for analyzing strategies in emerging economies (Xu & Meyer, 2013). 
Institutional variables have a strong impact on emerging-market MNEs’ decision-making 
process (Cui & Jiang, 2010; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). The ‘rules of the game’ in emerging 
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economies are less established than in developed ones and are usually more local context 
specific (Buckley et al., 2016). For these reasons, the institutional theory is considered a good 
way to lay a foundation for the international behavior of emerging-market MNEs, in 
particular, when they enter other emerging economies (Wright et al., 2005).  
Drawing on this perspective, some scholars argue that foreign investors need to 
accommodate to the institutional pressures they are exposed in host countries to build local 
legitimacy (Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). Apart from firm’s host 
country experience, bilateral diplomatic relations between the home and the host country may 
also play a role in facilitating local legitimacy building. Diplomatic relations between 
governments symbolize an interaction between home and host institutions and they may act as 
a ‘bridge’ between countries, thus facilitating investment decisions (Duanmu, 2014; Li et al., 
2018; Shapiro et al., 2018). Friendly diplomatic relations may stabilize host country 
institutional environment, reducing the risk perceived by foreign firms and enhancing their 
legitimacy in the host country (Child & Marinova, 2014; Li et al., 2018). 
Establishment mode choice has implications in terms of local legitimacy for the 
investing company. A greenfield investment may provide greater contributions to local 
development, since it represents the establishment of a new firm from scratch. Thus, it 
generates more potential opportunities for new job creation than an acquisition, where local 
facilities and existing jobs are transferred to a foreign acquirer. In addition, acquisitions may 
also raise suspicions in some host countries and generate institutional resistance, especially 
when the local target involves assets that are considered essential for the local economy, such 
as technology, natural resources, or utilities (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014; Meyer et al., 2014; 
Quer, Rienda, & Andreu, 2019a). Consequently, greenfield investments may be preferred by 
the host government. However, good diplomatic relations may contribute to reduce the 
legitimacy concerns of acquisitions, not only by the endorsement of the focal investment by 
10 
 
the home government, but also by facilitating reciprocal business opportunities for local firms 
in the investor’s home country. Government official visits are a key tool for building these 
bilateral diplomatic relationships between countries. They are the highest form of diplomacy 
and they usually pave the way for further development of bilateral relations (Nitsch, 2007). 
Therefore, government official visits may facilitate acquisitions of local companies.  
In light of the above, drawing on information economics and institutional theory, next 
we propose several hypotheses regarding the influence of both host country-specific 
experience and government official visits on establishment mode choice by Chinese MNEs in 
Latin America. 
Host country-specific experience and establishment mode choice 
As pointed out before, information economics suggests that foreign firms would prefer 
greenfield investments instead of acquisitions when lacking the require knowledge to evaluate 
and integrate local targets (Slangen & Hennart, 2007). Most extant empirical studies support 
this relationship, showing that prior host country experience tend to increase the likelihood of 
choosing acquisitions instead of greenfield investments (Andersson & Svensson, 1994; 
Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; Boellis et al., 2016; Demirbag, Tatoglu, & Glaister, 2008; 
Drogendijk & Slangen, 2006; Shaver, 1998; Slangen, 2013; Slangen & Hennart, 2008). 
However, empirical evidence is not conclusive since quite a few studies report insignificant 
results (Bhaumik & Gelb, 2005; Cho & Padmanabhan, 1995; Dow & Larimo; 2011; Hennart 
& Park, 1993; Larimo, 2003; Padmanabhan & Cho, 1999; Quer et al., 2019a; Slangen, 2011) 
and a few others find a negative relationship between host country experience and 
acquisitions (Chang & Rosenzweig, 2001; Chen, 2008; Rienda, Claver, & Quer, 2013). 
Actually, it has been also argued that lack of market knowledge may lead the firm to acquire a 
local firm in order to get access to that tacit knowledge (Dikova & Brouthers, 2016). 
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Anyway, the vast majority of prior research addressing the influence of host country-
specific experience on establishment mode choice focused on developed-country MNEs. Only 
a few studies looked at emerging markets as home countries (Quer et al., 2019a; Rienda et al., 
2013) or as host countries (Bhaumik & Gelb, 2005; Demirbag et al., 2008), and none of them 
focused simultaneously on emerging markets as home and host countries. 
Emerging-market MNEs operate in a home country with a less developed institutional 
environment. As stated above, although this may be considered a competitive disadvantage, it 
may become an advantage when doing business in other emerging economies with similar 
weak institutions (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). Therefore, more than knowledge on how 
to do business in an emerging market, lack of information about potential local targets may be 
more important when emerging-market MNEs enter other emerging economies. Furthermore, 
in the case of Chinese MNEs in Latin America, the relative high cultural distance between 
home and host countries may increase post-acquisition difficulties. In other words, the so-
called inspection and interaction problems may be more relevant than knowledge on how to 
do business in an emerging market. 
Drawing on the preceding reasoning from information economics, we argue that prior 
experience about the focal Latin American country makes the Chinese firm more 
knowledgeable and confident about local targets helping it to overcome inspection and 
interaction problems. Thus, host country knowledge is a kind of specific international 
experience that may be considered a ‘distance-bridging’ factor (Child, Ng, & Wong, 2002) 
that increases the likelihood of subsequent establishments through acquisitions (Dow & 
Larimo, 2011). As a result, we propose: 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the host country-specific experience by Chinese MNEs, the 




Government official visits and establishment mode choice 
As pointed out before, although most prior studies report that host country experience is 
positively associated with acquisitions, there are also studies reporting a not significant or 
even a negative relationship. Therefore, we could ask why firms with little host country 
experience may undertake acquisitions. The answer may arise from the above-mentioned 
good bilateral diplomatic relationships between the home and the host country that may be a 
substitute of host country experience as a ‘distance-bridging’ factor. The support provided by 
the home government may offset the need to accumulate prior host country-specific 
experience (Lu et al., 2014). This leads us to consider the role played by institutions in 
shaping the behavior of Chinese MNEs, especially when choosing the establishment mode in 
other emerging economies. 
Child and Marinova (2014) argue that the Chinese government can stabilize host 
country institutional environments for Chinese firms through the development of strong 
bilateral diplomatic relations. In particular, prior research reports that, by organizing 
government official visits to a host country, the Chinese government can be viewed as a 
‘signaler’ who may alleviate information asymmetries for Chinese investors in the host 
environment (Voss et al., 2017). Furthermore, diplomacy may catalyze networking between 
Chinese firms and potential local targets and increase legitimacy in the host country (Li et al., 
2018). Thus, Chinese government visits contribute to create a friendlier local environment for 
Chinese investors that allow them to overcome the liability of foreignness (Zhang, Jiang, & 
Zhou, 2014). This may also help to alleviate the inspection and interaction problems involved 
in the acquisition of a local firm.  
These positive effects of Chinese government official visits may be even more evident 
in other emerging economies such as those of Latin America (Quer et al., 2019b). During 
high-profile state visits by China’s leaders to developing countries, China has signed wide-
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ranging bilateral economic cooperation agreements along with the granting of China’s 
development aids generally allocated to infrastructure projects in the focal host country 
(Buckley et al., 2018). For that reason, we argue that the legitimacy concerns by the host 
government derived from the acquisition of a local target can be alleviated in emerging 
economies by means of such diplomatic activities. Overall, the latter may be considered as a 
facilitator of acquisitions for those investing firms lacking host country experience. Based on 
the foregoing reasoning, we propose:  
Hypothesis 2: Recent Chinese government official visits to the focal host country 
moderate the impact of prior entry experience on the choice of acquisitions by Chinese 
MNEs. 
 
DATA AND METHOD 
Sample 
Our data were mainly obtained from the Monitor of Chinese OFDI in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, developed by the Academic Network of Latin America and the Caribbean on 
China (Red ALC-China). This database covers Chinese investments in the region dating back 
to 2000 and includes information on the establishment mode used by each company. In order 
to improve data reliability, we resorted to other secondary data sources: the China Global 
Investment Tracker (a comprehensive database of China’s OFDI since 2005, compiled by the 
American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation), news items reported by Chinese 
media (such as Xinhua, China Daily, and Global Times) and information provided by each 
firm’s corporate website. 
Our final sample contains 315 OFDIs carried out by Chinese firms in 15 Latin 
America countries between 2000 and 2017. Table 1 reports a more detailed description of our 
sample. Greenfield investments (209, 66.3%) prevail over acquisitions (106, 33.7%) as 
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establishment modes. Brazil leads the ranking of top destinations (134 investments), followed 
by Mexico (49), Peru (29), and Argentina (25), these four countries accounting for over 75 
percent of the observations. By industry, companies belonging to materials industry 
predominate (53 investments), followed by telecommunications services (52), energy (50), 
industrials (45), and consumer discretionary (44). These five industries account for 77 percent 
of the OFDIs included in our sample. As for individual companies, Huawei (15 investments), 
China National Petroleum Corporation [CNPC] (12), China Three Gorges (8), Sinopec (7), 
State Grid (7), and Aluminum Corporation of China [Chinalco] (6) are the top investors. 
‘Insert Table 1 here’ 
Dependent variable 
Establishment mode. This is a dummy variable that equals to one if the Chinese MNE 
acquired a local company, and zero if it established a greenfield subsidiary (Chen et al., 2017; 
Hennart & Park, 1993; Larimo, 2003; Meyer et al., 2014; Quer et al., 2019a; Rienda et al., 
2013). Following prior studies on establishment mode choice, joint ventures have been 
included in the greenfield investment category (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; Brouthers & 
Hennart, 2007). 
Explanatory variable 
Host country experience. We measured prior local experience through a dummy variable 
coded one if the Chinese firm already had subsidiaries in the host country before it established 
the focal subsidiary, and zero otherwise (Estrin, Baghdasaryan, & Meyer, 2009; Li et al., 2018; 
Nagano, 2013; Quer et al., 2019a, 2019b; Slangen, 2011). 
Moderating variable 
Government visit. We created a dummy variable equal to one if a Chinese government 
delegation paid an official visit to the host country in the focal year or in the immediate 
previous year, and zero otherwise (Quer et al., 2019b; Voss et al., 2017). Collecting data from 
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the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China website, we included visits 
by the Chinese President, Prime Minister, Ministers or Vice Ministers of Commerce, Foreign 
Affairs, Transport, etc., as well as senior officials of other Chinese governmental institutions 
such as the National People’s Congress, the Politburo Standing Committee, and the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference.  
Control variables 
We also included a number of control variables that, according to extant research, might also 
influence establishment mode choice. Most prior studies report a negative relationship 
between cultural distance and acquisitions (Dikova & Brouthers, 2016). The underlying 
arguments are related to the higher costs of managing acquisitions in culturally-distant 
countries (Kogut & Singh, 1988) and the difficulties to transfer management practices to 
acquired units in such destinations (Drogendijk & Slangen, 2006). However, other studies 
suggest that acquisitions allow to access local knowledge thus reducing uncertainties when 
cultural distance is high (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Rienda et al., 2013). Hence, we 
controlled for the cultural distance between China and each host Latin American country 
using the Kogut and Singh’s (1988) index, that has been extensively used in prior research 
(Estrin et al., 2009; Larimo, 2003; Quer et al., 2019a; Rienda et al., 2013; Slangen, 2011; 
Slangen & Hennart, 2008). We based on the extended Hofstede’s model with six dimensions 
(Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010).  
It has been argued that the diaspora living in the host country is a kind of social capital 
that may facilitate acquisition of local market information by foreign firms from the 
diaspora’s country of origin (Amighini, Rabellotti, & Sanfilipo, 2012; Anwar & Mughal, 
2013; Li, Li, & Shapiro, 2012). As a result, it may contribute to reduce the perceived 
uncertainty in the host country, thus affecting the choice between acquisitions and greenfield 
investments. Therefore, we controlled for the potential effect of the Chinese diaspora, using 
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the percentage of ethnic Chinese to the total population in each Latin American country. In 
doing so, we used data from the Shao Center of the Ohio University and the CIA World 
Factbook. 
The effectiveness of the host government is considered a facilitator to secure 
acquisitions and legally protect long-term interests of emerging-market MNEs when they 
enter other emerging economies (Deng & Yang, 2015). We controlled for this factor using 
government effectiveness, one of the six dimensions of the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
proposed by the World Bank for measuring the governance infrastructure quality of a country 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009). This variable deals with the quality of public services, 
civil service and policies, the independence from political pressures, and the credibility of 
government’s commitment to these policies. 
OFDI drivers may also affect establishment mode choice. First, past studies suggest 
that natural resource-seeking acquisitions by Chinese firms may raise suspicions in some host 
countries, in particular, when the targets are critical resources for the local economy 
(Globerman & Shapiro, 2009). Hence, we controlled for resource endowment using the 
percentage of fuel, ore, and metal exports to total merchandize exports by each host country, 
with a log transformation (Buckley et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2014). Second, compared to 
greenfield investments, acquisitions allow a quicker entry (Globerman & Shapiro, 2009). For 
that reason, acquisitions have been the usual establishment mode by Chinese MNEs to access 
the strategic assets they need to catch up with incumbent competitors (Luo & Tung, 2007). 
We controlled for this factor using technology endowment, measured through the log of the 
total number of patent applications in the host country divided by its GDP (Buckley et al., 
2016; Meyer et al., 2014). Third, past studies argue that acquisitions will be preferred in slow-
growth markets as they do not increase production capacity, reducing the risk of retaliation 
(Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000). Actually, by acquiring a competitor, the foreign firm may 
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reduce competition, whereas a greenfield investment creates a new competitor (Hennart and 
Park, 1993). Conversely, high-growth markets can support production capacity growth 
(Larimo, 2003) and entail a lower threat of curbing incumbents’ earnings (Dikova & van 
Witteloostuijn, 2007). Thus, we included market growth as a control variable, measured by 
the annual percentage of GDP growth in each host country (Boellis et al., 2016; Buckley et al., 
2016; Zhang et al., 2014). For these three drivers, we collected data from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank with one-year lag. 
In addition, a lower level of development in the host country increases information 
asymmetries for foreign firms (Meyer et al., 2009) whereas a higher development level may 
increase the availability of attractive acquisition candidates that fulfill the requirements of the 
investing firm (Larimo, 2003). Therefore, we controlled for the level of economic 
development, using a dummy variable, coded one if the host country is a member of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and zero otherwise 
(Buckley et al., 2007; Gubbi et al., 2010). 
Past research considered the size of the investing firm as a proxy for its availability of 
resources. However, empirical evidence is mixed, since some studies reported a positive 
relationship between firm size and acquisitions, while others found just the opposite or even 
no relationship (Dikova & Brouthers, 2016). Thus, we controlled for firm size using the log of 
the number of employees (Boellis et al., 2016; Demirbag et al., 2008; Xu et al., 2018). 
OFDI by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may raise institutional resistance in 
host countries because of the conflicting roles of the private sector and the government in the 
economy (Lattemann et al., 2017). As a result, several studies show that Chinese SOEs adapt 
their establishment modes to overcome distrust and gain local legitimacy in host countries 
(Meyer et al., 2014; Quer et al., 2019a). Moreover, Xie, Reddy, and Liang (2017) argue that 
Chinese SOEs are more likely to invest in host countries with strong political connections and 
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high export dependence on China, as is the case of some Latin American countries. For that 
reason, we included state ownership as a control, through the percentage of state equity in the 
Chinese investor (Duanmu, 2014; Quer et al., 2019a).  
It has been also argued that those firms with extensive experience with a particular 
establishment mode tend to use the same mode in subsequent entries. This is either because 
they have accumulated the skills needed to manage that establishment mode, reducing 
implementation costs, or because they copy their past behavior to reduce risk (Chang & 
Rosenzweig, 2001; Padmanabhan & Cho, 1999). Hence, we controlled for establishment 
mode experience, distinguishing between acquisition experience and greenfield experience 
(Dikova & van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Drogendijk & Slangen, 2006; Slangen, 2011, 2013; 
Slangen & Hennart, 2008). Both variables were measured as the log of one plus the number of 
prior acquisitions or greenfield investments carried out worldwide by the Chinese firm before 
the current establishment mode decision. 
Another type of experience that may also affect establishment mode decisions is the 
so-called vicarious experience, i.e., the experience of others that share a common 
characteristic (Jiang, Holburn, & Beamish, 2014). Firms tend to follow similar organizations 
that have been successful in a new market (Haveman, 1993). One of those common features is 
a similar cultural background derived from the country of origin. Companies from the same 
home country usually face the same obstacles in a host country and absorbing their experience 
may be easier (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Tan & Meyer, 2011). Thus, following past studies 
on Chinese MNEs, we controlled for vicarious experience by considering prior investments 
by other Chinese firms in the host country (Lu et al., 2014; Yuan & Pangarkar, 2010). We 
used a dummy variable, taking a value of one if other Chinese firms had previously 
established subsidiaries in the focal Latin American country, and zero otherwise. 
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The size of the investment may also matter. Whereas an acquisition provides the 
acquirer with the managerial and financial resources of the acquired unit, a greenfield 
investment relies primarily on internal resources (Caves & Mehra, 1986; Dikova & Brouthers, 
2016). As a result, empirical evidence tend to support that the larger the investment size, the 
more likely that entry will be through an acquisition (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Hennart 
& Park, 1993; Slangen & Hennart, 2008). However, an alternative reasoning suggests that, 
when investment size is large, a greenfield investment may be preferred, since it allows the 
investor to make an initial smaller investment and increase it gradually later (Brouthers & 
Dikova, 2010). Therefore, we included investment size as a control, in millions of US$ with a 
log transformation. 
We also controlled for industry effects by including 10 dummy variables, according to 
the two-digit Global Industry Classification Standard (Meyer et al., 2014). Finally, we 
included 18-year dummies to capture potentially time-varying influences (Barkema & 
Vermeulen, 1998; Bhaumik & Gelb, 2005; Slangen, 2013; Slangen & Hennart, 2008). 
 
RESULTS 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics, bivariate correlations and variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) between variables. Since all VIFs are well below the recommended cut-off point of 10, 
this allows us to reject serious multicollinearity problems in our analysis (Kutner et al., 2005). 
‘Insert Table 2 here’ 
To test the hypotheses, we used a binomial logistic regression given the dichotomous 
nature of our dependent variable. The results are displayed in Table 3 with a positive ß 
coefficient meaning a preference for acquisitions and a negative ß coefficient meaning a 
preference for greenfield investments. 
‘Insert Table 3 here’ 
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Model 1 is the baseline model with only control variables, whereas Model 2 includes 
the direct effect of the explanatory variable and Model 3 adds the interaction between the 
explanatory variable and the moderator. All models turned out to be statistically significant (p 
< 0.001). Following the suggestions of Meyer, van Witteloostuijn, and Beugelsdijk (2017), 
we report odds ratios to assess effect size of each independent variable and the exact p-values 
to reflect actual statistical significance. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that firm’s prior host country experience has a positive effect 
on the likelihood of choosing acquisitions. This hypothesis is supported, since the regression 
coefficient of host country experience is positive and significant in Model 2 (β = 0.910, p = 
0.042). As for the effect size of host country experience, we calculated it as the standard 
deviation increase times the odds ratio (Li et al., 2018). The standard deviation of this variable 
reported in Table 2 (0.42) multiplied by its odds ratio in Model 2 as shown in Table 3 (2.483) 
gives a result of 1.04. Thus, we can state that a standard deviation increase in firm’s prior host 
country experience makes an acquisition 1.04 times more preferred than a greenfield 
investment in that host country. 
Model 3 tests the moderating effect of government visits. We obtained a statistically 
significant and negative interaction term (β = -3.430, p = 0.046). This result suggests a 
negative moderating effect of official government visits on the relationship between host 
country experience and the likelihood that the firm will choose acquisitions. In other words, a 
recent visit by the Chinese government to a host country reduces the importance of firm’s 
prior host country experience when choosing the establishment mode. Therefore, Hypothesis 
2 is also supported. 
To help interpret this result, we plotted the relationship between the explanatory and 
the dependent variables, and the moderating effect of government visits. Based on the results 
reported in Model 3, Figure 1 illustrates the change on the likelihood of choosing acquisitions 
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instead of greenfield investments when the explanatory and the moderating variables change 
from their low values (one standard deviation below the mean) to their high values (one 
standard deviation above the mean), keeping all other variables at their mean level. Figure 1 
shows that the positive effect of prior host country experience is weaker at high values of 
government visits than at low values, thus providing further support to Hypothesis 2. 
‘Insert Figure 1 here’ 
As for control variables, two of them demonstrated significance in all models, namely, 
establishment mode experience and investment size. More precisely, we found that Chinese 
firms with prior experience with an establishment mode tend to use the same mode in 
subsequent entries, in particular, when that prior experience refers to greenfield subsidiaries. 
Besides, we obtained that the larger the size of the investment, the more likely that the 
Chinese MNE will establish through the acquisition of a local company. 
Robustness checks 
To assess the sensitive and robustness of our findings, we conducted a number of 
supplementary analyses. The results are displayed in Table 4.  
‘Insert Table 4 here’ 
First, we replicated the original regressions using the number of subsidiaries 
established by the firm in the same host country prior to the focal entry as a measure of host 
country experience. The results of this robustness test, shown in Models 2a and 3a of Table 4, 
are similar to those reported in our main analysis, although with a lower statistical 
significance in the case of the interaction term. Second, we ran the regressions using the 
number of government official visits as an alternative measure for the moderating variable. 
The results, reported in Models 2b and 3b of Table 4, are consistent to those obtained in our 
original regressions, although with a slightly lower statistical significance in both cases.  
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Finally, we added several control variables that were not included in our main 
regression analysis because they were correlated with other variables as indicated by the high 
VIF values we obtained when conducting multicollinearity tests. Thus, we considered GDP 
per capita, instead of OECD membership, as a proxy of the level of economic development in 
the host country. Moreover, we controlled for signs of good diplomatic relations using a 
dummy variable, coded as one if a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement between 
China and each host country was in force before the focal investment, and as zero otherwise. 
In addition, we proxied the intensity of bilateral trade relations by including China’s exports 
to each host country and China’s imports from each host country. The results obtained after 
adding all these control variables, displayed in Models 2c and 3c of Table 4, turned out to be 
similar to those of our original analysis. 
 
DISCUSSION 
This study aimed to advance our understanding of establishment mode decisions made by 
emerging-market MNEs in other emerging economies. In doing so, we addressed two main 
questions: (1) to what extent is firm’s prior host country experience a factor that facilitates the 
acquisition of a local target; and (2) are home government official visits to the host country a 
substitute of host country experience? By integrating insights from information economics 
and institutional theory, and using China as the home country and Latin America as the host 
destination, we provided empirical evidence for answering both questions. 
With regard to the first question, we obtained that the higher the host country-specific 
experience by the Chinese investor, the higher the likelihood that it establishes in that country 
through the acquisition of a local firm instead of by a greenfield subsidiary. Prior research, 
mainly focused on developed-country MNEs, reported conflicting results regarding the 
influence of firm’s prior host country experience on establishment mode choice. Our findings 
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suggest that, when doing business in other emerging economies, emerging-market MNEs may 
tap their advantage of being familiar with a similar less developed institutional environment 
like that of their home country. Hence, instead of acquiring a local firm because they lack 
market knowledge, they opt for acquisitions when they have accumulated host country-
specific experience that allows them to overcome the obstacles derived from the information 
asymmetries inherent in a cross-border acquisition as well as to increase their local legitimacy.  
As for the second question, we obtained that recent official visits paid by the Chinese 
government to the host country moderate the positive effect of prior entry experience on the 
choice of acquisitions by Chinese MNEs. Government official visits may replace host country 
experience as a ‘distance-bridging’ factor, thus facilitating the entry through the acquisition of 
a local company. Therefore, for those firms lacking host country-specific experience, the 
existence of good diplomatic relations between home and host governments may create 
friendlier local conditions that contribute to reduce the liability of foreignness and to build 
local legitimacy. In other words, home government support through the development of solid 
bilateral diplomatic relations may counterbalance the lack of host country experience. 
Contributions 
Our study makes several contributions. First, from a theoretical standpoint, we extend both 
information economics and institutional theory by analyzing how home country institutions, 
through the establishment of good bilateral diplomatic relationships, may pave the way of 
host country institutional environment and help to reduce information asymmetries. More 
precisely, we argue that home government official visits to the host country may act as a 
substitute of firm’s prior experience in that country as a way to alleviate the inspection and 




We focused on emerging economies as home and host markets. By using this specific 
research context, our study contributes to the current epistemological debate on the 
applicability of extant theories, mainly drawn from developed-country MNEs, for explaining 
the less conventional behavior of emerging-market MNEs reported by prior studies (Buckley 
et al., 2018). In doing so, we follow the view by Cuervo-Cazurra (2012) who suggests that, 
beyond the dichotomy between traditional and new theories, the study of emerging-market 
MNEs allows to extend theory. Actually, as Xu and Meyer (2013) suggest, by drawing 
attention to context-specific characteristics, research on emerging economies is a useful 
empirical setting for advancing theories. 
Second, we also provide new insights on establishment mode decisions by emerging-
market MNEs entering other emerging economies. As pointed out before, past studies 
addressing the influence of host country-specific experience on establishment mode choice 
did not focus on emerging economies as home and host counties simultaneously. As for 
Chinese MNEs, only a few prior studies dealt with establishment mode choice (Anderson & 
Sutherland, 2015; Meyer et al., 2014; Quer et al., 2019a; Wu, Liu, & Huang, 2012). Among 
them, only that of Quer et al. (2019a) analyzed the influence of host country-specific 
experience, reporting an insignificant result, although not considering emerging economies as 
specific destinations. 
Our study also offers managerial and policy implications. Emerging economies in 
general and those of Latin America in particular are becoming increasingly key targets for 
China’s OFDI. Beyond their traditional role as sources of natural resources, now Chinese 
MNEs look for business opportunities in these countries either as markets or as locations for 
the development of infrastructure projects. For that reason, the Chinese government is paying 
special attention on the establishment of friendly diplomatic relations with such emerging 
economies in order to facilitate operations of Chinese firms. This kind of government support 
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is even more relevant in Latin American countries, since cultural distance amplifies the costs 
of identifying potential local targets and the post-acquisition integration of acquired units. Our 
results suggest that good bilateral diplomatic relations may be especially useful for those 
Chinese firms lacking the local knowledge needed for establishing through acquisitions in 
these destinations. 
Limitations 
Our study has a number of limitations. First, the operationalization of variables may constrain 
the interpretation of our results. In our main analysis, we used dummy variables as a proxy of 
both the explanatory and the moderator variables. Although when performing the robustness 
tests we used the number of subsidiaries and the number of government official visits as 
alternative measures, lack of data prevented us from using other approaches. With regard to 
the explanatory variable, the length of host country experience in terms of the number of 
years since the first entry could also matter (Hennart, Sheng, & Pimenta, 2015). Similarly, as 
for the moderator, those government official visits with a more specific business orientation 
might have a strong influence (Voss et al., 2017).  
Second, we used secondary data sources in our empirical analysis. This precludes 
capturing managerial perceptions on to what extent prior host country experience and Chinese 
government official visits contribute to mitigate inspection and interaction problems 
associated with acquisitions as well as to increase local legitimacy. Another limitation derives 
from analyzing establishment mode choice by emerging-market MNEs from a single home 
country–China–in a single host region–Latin America. The idiosyncratic characteristics of 
Chinese MNEs as well as those of the relationships between Chinese and Latin American 






Our study opens avenues for further research. Future studies may use alternative ways for 
variable operationalization, trying to investigate if the length of firm’s host country-specific 
experience and/or those government official visits including a delegation of Chinese firms’ 
managers have a stronger impact on the reduction of acquisition-related problems. 
Furthermore, it could be interesting to collect primary data on the perceptions of managers 
who make decisions on establishment mode. This would allow obtaining information not only 
on the degree to which firm-specific resources and government support affect, but also on 
what are the most important perceived barriers when choosing between acquisitions and 
greenfield investments in a particular host country. 
Finally, in order to increase generalizability and transferability of our results, further 
studies are needed either analyzing establishment mode decisions by Chinese MNEs in other 
emerging countries outside Latin America, or replicating our study in a broader population of 
emerging-market MNEs from various home countries entering several emerging economies 
worldwide. By doing so, future research may contribute to discern whether the above-
mentioned less conventional behavior of emerging-market MNEs also applies to non-Chinese 
MNEs or is context-specific. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Our study advances the understanding of the role played by firm-specific factors and bilateral 
diplomatic relations between countries on establishment mode decisions made by emerging-
market MNEs in other emerging economies. Drawing on information economics and 
institutional theory, we investigated the interplay between firm’s prior host country 
experience and home government official visits. By examining Chinese MNEs in Latin 
America, we obtained that, when the foreign firm has prior experience in the host country, an 
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acquisition is preferred to a greenfield subsidiary. We argued that prior experience helps the 
foreign firm to overcome information asymmetries associated with the acquisition of a local 
firm and to build local legitimacy. Moreover, bilateral diplomatic relations also matter, since 
our study highlights that recent home government official visits to the focal host country tend 
to reduce the importance of host country experience.  
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Table 1. Sample description 
 Observations Percent 
Establishment mode   
Greenfield investment 209 66.3 
Acquisition 106 33.7 
Host country   
Brazil 134 42.5 
Mexico 49 15.6 
Peru 29 9.2 
Argentina 25 7.9 
Venezuela 18 5.7 
Chile 17 5.4 
Ecuador 15 4.8 
Colombia 9 2.9 
Panama 8 2.5 
Bolivia 4 1.3 
Cuba 2 0.6 
Uruguay 2 0.6 
El Salvador 1 0.3 
Honduras 1 0.3 
Nicaragua 1 0.3 
Industry   
Materials 53 16.8 
Telecommunication services 52 16.5 
Energy 50 15.9 
Industrials 45 14.3 
Consumer discretionary 44 14 
Financials 31 9.8 
Consumer staples 21 6.7 
Utilities 9 2.9 
Information technology 8 2.5 
Health care 2 0.6 
Investor   
Huawei 15 4.8 
China National Petroleum Corporation [CNPC] 12 3.8 
China Three Gorges 8 2.5 
Sinopec 7 2.2 
State Grid 7 2.2 
Aluminum Corporation of China [Chinalco] 6 1.9 
China Construction Bank 5 1.6 
China Fishery Group 5 1.6 
China Minmetals 5 1.6 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China [ICBC] 5 1.6 
Sany Heavy Industry Co. 5 1.6 
ZTE 5 1.6 
Other 230 73 
Total sample 315 100 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations  
Variables Mean SD VIF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Establishment mode 0.34 0.47 N.A. 1                
2 Host country experience 0.23 0.42 1.61 0.214 1               
3 Government visit 0.91 0.29 1.94 0.081 0.039 1              
4 Cultural distance 2.73 0.84 4.42 -0.216 -0.149 -0.246 1             
5 Diaspora 0.45 0.80 2.10 0.092 0.101 0.052 0.150 1            
6 Government effectiveness -0.13 0.43 3.51 -0.044 -0.107 0.033 0.038 -0.408 1           
7 Resource endowment 1.36 0.47 1.97 0.015 0.043 0.409 -0.115 0.336 -0.275 1          
8 Technology endowment -7.94 0.20 3.24 0.067 -0.057 0.003 -0.368 -0.386 0.329 -0.033 1         
9 Market growth 2.59 3.79 3.15 -0.112 -0.126 -0.078 0.125 0.244 0.064 0.076 -0.110 1        
10 Economic development 0.21 0.41 5.66 -0.169 -0.116 0.051 0.500 -0.226 0.643 -0.035 0.225 0.051 1       
11 Firm size 4.40 0.96 2.14 -0.028 0.213 -0.042 0.010 0.041 -0.173 0.092 -0.127 -0.059 -0.124 1      
12 State ownership 39.12 41.79 2.22 0.178 0.151 0.058 -0.092 0.070 -0.161 0.148 -0.016 -0.078 -0.153 0.466 1     
13 Acquisition experience 0.25 0.40 2.62 0.321 0.416 0.107 -0.158 0.114 -0.156 0.101 -0.124 -0.234 -0.203 0.283 0.475 1    
14 Greenfield experience 0.21 0.31 2.25 0.009 0.380 0.055 0.063 0.194 -0.173 0.059 -0.269 -0.027 -0.150 0.454 0.308 0.466 1   
15 Vicarious experience 0.94 0.24 2.86 0.011 0.139 0.343 -0.113 -0.025 0.085 0.032 -0.107 -0.118 0.065 -0.043 -0.019 0.147 0.110 1  
16 Investment size 1.88 0.97 2.06 0.335 0.255 0.034 -0.192 0.133 -0.119 0.006 -0.051 -0.092 -0.239 0.299 0.422 0.415 0.279 0.117 1 









Table 3. Binomial logistic regression results of establishment mode choice 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 ß SE OR p-value ß SE OR p-value ß SE OR p-value 
Explanatory variable             
Host country experience     0.910 0.447 2.483 0.042 4.193 1.720 66.206 0.015 
Moderating variable             
Government visit     1.463 0.814 4.320 0.072 2.479 1.024 11.933 0.016 
Interaction             
Host country experience x 
Government visit          -3.430 1.723 0.032 0.046 
Control variables             
Cultural distance -0.353 0.375 0.702 0.346 -0.015 0.406 0.985 0.971 0.031 0.415 1.032 0.940 
Diaspora 0.118 0.254 1,126 0.641 0.071 0.261 1.074 0.784 0.128 0.269 1.137 0.633 
Government effectiveness -0.061 0.679 0.941 0.929 0.156 0.692 1.169 0.821 0.241 0.706 1.273 0.733 
Resource endowment -0.036 0.460 0.965 0.938 -0.270 0.498 0.763 0.587 -0.462 0.519 0.630 0.373 
Technology endowment 1.063 1.444 2.896 0.462 1.516 1.546 4.555 0.327 2.165 1.640 8.717 0.187 
Market growth 0.053 0.077 1.054 0.492 0.076 0.080 1.079 0.344 0.105 0.085 1,110 0.216 
Economic development -0.325 0.964 0.722 0.736 -0.962 0.987 0.382 0.330 -1.070 0.996 0.343 0.283 
Firm size -0.242 0.254 0.785 0.341 -0.212 0.262 0.809 0.418 -0.234 0.266 0.791 0.379 
State ownership 0.003 0.006 1.003 0.568 0.004 0.006 1.004 0.458 0.005 0.006 1.005 0.416 
Acquisition experience 1.221 0.622 3.392 0.049 1.017 0.641 2.764 0.113 1.122 0.657 3.070 0.088 
Greenfield experience -1.659 0.797 0.190 0.037 -2.212 0.858 0.109 0.010 -2.331 0.848 0.097 0.006 
Vicarious experience -1.304 1.104 0.271 0.238 -1.513 1.100 0.220 0.169 -1.943 1.134 0.143 0.087 
Investment size 0.633 0.237 1.883 0.008 0.597 0.239 1.817 0.012 0.620 0.241 1.858 0.010 
Fit measures             
Chi-square 122.199 (p-value = 0.000) 129.198 (p-value = 0.000) 132.975 (p-value = 0.000) 
Overall % correct 82.4 82.4 82.4 
-2 log likelihood 256.933 249.934 246.157 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.469 0.490 0.502 
Notes: No. of observations = 315. Dependent variable: (1) acquisition; (0) greenfield investment. 






Table 4. Binomial logistic regression results of establishment mode choice (Robustness checks) 
 Model 2a Model 3a Model 2b Model 3b Model 2c Model 3c 
 ß p-value ß p-value ß p-value ß p-value ß p-value ß p-value 
Explanatory variable             
Host country experience 2.339 0.037 9.830 0.036 0.831 0.062 2.535 0.016 0.904 0.047 4.287 0.012 
Moderating variable             
Government visit 1.456 0.075 2.225 0.025 0.631 0.055 0.954 0.012 1.885 0.048 3.031 0.010 
Interaction             
Host country experience x Government 
visit    -7.752 0.100   -1.232 0.072   -3.565 0.038 
Control variables             
Cultural distance -0.013 0.974 0.024 0.953 -0.160 0.682 -0.096 0.810 -0.656 0.164 -0.723 0.140 
Diaspora 0.085 0.743 0.129 0.628 0.099 0.702 0.127 0.624 0.164 0.650 0.194 0.614 
Government effectiveness 0.164 0.813 0.240 0.733 0.106 0.878 0.117 0.868 -0.256 0.659 -0.158 0.799 
Resource endowment -0.276 0.580 -0.436 0.401 -0.219 0.651 -0.355 0.479 -0.432 0.465 -0.652 0.296 
Technology endowment 1.462 0.344 1.880 0.242 1.258 0.402 1.920 0.226 1.871 0.354 2.390 0.276 
Market growth 0.075 0.348 0.097 0.245 0.083 0.306 0.095 0.245 0.051 0.566 0.073 0.436 
Economic development -0.946 0.337 -1.025 0.301 -0.858 0.385 -0.984 0.328 1.608 0.578 1.370 0.653 
Firm size -0.199 0.449 -0.233 0.379 -0.186 0.479 -0.168 0.528 -0.222 0.405 -0.244 0.367 
State ownership 0.004 0.488 0.004 0.457 0.004 0.459 0.005 0.348 0.004 0.466 0.005 0.438 
Acquisition experience 0.983 0.125 1.035 0.111 1.005 0.117 1.068 0.105 1.110 0.090 1.230 0.067 
Greenfield experience -2.331 0.008 -2.314 0.007 -2.191 0.011 -2.287 0.008 -2.303 0.011 -2.391 0.007 
Vicarious experience -1.485 0.178 -1.760 0.115 -1.328 0.226 -1.438 0.189 -1.362 0.233 -1.734 0.137 
Investment size 0.610 0.011 0.639 0.008 0.617 0.010 0.618 0.010 0.633 0.010 0.668 0.007 
Strategic partnership         0.107 0.902 0.316 0.725 
China’s exports         -0.737 0.403 -0.791 0.379 
China’s imports         -0.562 0.599 -0.724 0.528 
Fit measures             
Chi-square 129.523  (p-value = 0.000) 
132.134  
(p-value = 0.000) 
129.387  
(p-value = 0.000) 
132.615  
(p-value = 0.000) 
130.072  
(p-value = 0.000) 
134.260  
(p-value = 0.000) 
Overall % correct 82.4 82.4 83.1 82.4 82.4 83.1 
-2 log likelihood 249.609 246.999 249.745 246.517 249.060 244.872 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.491 0.499 0.491 0.501 0.493 0.505 
Notes: No. of observations = 315. Dependent variable: (1) acquisition; (0) greenfield investment. 
Industry and year dummies are included but not shown. Standard errors and Odds ratios are not reported but are available upon request.
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